Ewing v. State, Dept. of Transp. Appellant\u27s Reply Brief Dckt. 34541 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
3-31-2008
Ewing v. State, Dept. of Transp. Appellant's Reply
Brief Dckt. 34541
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Ewing v. State, Dept. of Transp. Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 34541" (2008). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 1669.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/1669
FILED - iCOPY 
MAR 3 I 2008 
Supreme court __ court of l\jljlta/s 
EnteredonATSby:_ -
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE ST ATE OF IDAHO 
JOHN E. EWING, and NOREEN EWING, 
Appellants, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT 
OF TRANSPORTATION, 
Respondent. 
DOCKET NO. 34541 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the 1st Judicial District for Kootenai County. 
Honorable Charles Hosack, District Judge presiding. 
Michael J. Verbillis 
Residing at Coeur d'Alene, ID for Appellants. 
Michael E. Kelly 
Residing at Boise, ID for Respondent. 
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III. 
INTRODUCTION 
As anticipated, Respondent has attempted to walk the thin line between commending the 
Trial Court for it's wisdom in ushering Mr. Ewing to the exit doorofthe courthouse on the thin basis 
of the Recreational Use Statute, while simultaneously urging that the Trial Court committed error 
by not tossing the case out of court based upon the notion that Mr. Ewing was somehow a statutory 
employee of the State ofidaho when he was injured. 
1. The Trial Court Incorrectly Ruled that the Recremtional Use Statute is Applicable to 
the Case at Bar. 
The Trial Court and Respondent before this Court take the position that Mr. Ewing was 
"recreating" when he was seriously injured falling in a poorly compacted area following underground 
plumbing activities at Mineral Mountain Rest Area. This holding and subsequent rhetoric of 
Respondent is singularly based upon the placement of a "picnic table" within the confines of the 
Mineral Mountain Rest Area property. The logic spins thus: even though Ewing was at work and 
taking a break from his work day to sit down and have quick bite of lunch or to use the public 
facilities, at that precise moment, he was "recreating." Thus, the State is shielded by the 
Recreational Use Statute. Idaho Code §36-1604. It appears as though the Trial Court and 
Respondent have analyzed the applicable case law as requiring an examination as to the purpose or 
intention of the user of the property at the moment of injury. 
As Respondent states: 
This Court held that the Recreational Use Statute requires only that the recreational 
user use the owner's property for recreational purposes. 
Respondent's Brief, pg. 9-10. 
For the Trial Court to rnle as a matter oflaw, that the momentary break from the day's toils 
to have a snack is "recreation," constitutes an end rnn on the role of the jury. Shouldn't Mr. Ewing 
be entitled to allow a jury to determine whether or not he was on the property for the purpose of 
recreating, rather than the Trial Court and the Deputy Attorney General? 
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Let us imagine, for a moment, a parallel universe in which a statute, not unlike Idaho's 
Recreational Use Statute, has a long laundry list of activities that are considered recreational in their 
basic purpose and this law includes "bird watching" as a listed activity. Let's suppose that a person, 
not unlike John Ewing, is working on a project, not unlike the one in the case at bar, and he leaves 
his work site to enter the adjacent prope1iy ( coincidentally owned by the same property owner). Let 
us further suppose this person in this parallel universe spots a robin, a common first sign of Spring. 
Again, to carry this analogous fact pattern one step further, image that this person then, after briefly 
glancing at the robin, steps in a similar soft spot ofland and has injuries, not unlike Ewing. Would 
the Trial Court and thus the Attorney General argue that since the purpose for which Mr. Ewing 
entered the property was to watch birds, he, therefore, is barred from bringing an action? 
The Undersigned humbly submits that the answer to the preceding rather hyperbolic analogy 
is quite simple and straight forward. BaiTing Mr. Ewing from submitting his case to the jury in this 
case does violence to the purpose of the statute and elevates sophistry to jurisprudence. 
Simply put, Mr. Ewing is entitled to let a jury determine for what purpose he was entering 
this property and not have improper inferences indulged by the Trial Court and Respondent. 
2. John Ewing was not the Statutory Employee of the State of Idaho, Department of 
Transportation When He was Injured. 
The briefing to this Court is not radically different thai1 the briefing to the Trial Court on this 
question. Notwithstai1ding the skilled efforts of counsel for Respondent to mischaracterize the 
players in this draina, it's logic also fails. 
The analysis of catego1y 1 and category 2 statutory employer/employee status under Idaho 
Code §72-223 is really quite simple. If an employee is injured on the job and his immediate 
employer has no worker's compensation, but the prime contractor on the job has worker's 
compensation coverage, then that contractor becomes the statutory employer. It is an imputed 
relationship that the legislature has placed upon contractors to see to it that those subcontractors 
working under them have the financial responsibility to insure their workmen. In the event such 
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subcontractors do not provide such coverage, the law will impose that burden on the prime 
contractor. It is thus social policy enacted by the legislature to insure that injured workers will not 
go uncompensated by reason of the fiscal irresponsibility of their immediate employer. Id. 
As indicated in previous briefing to this Court, before the 1996 Amendment to the Statute, 
an injured worker was free to sue his statutoiy employer whether or not there existed worker's 
compensation in the chain of contractors, if there was an independent basis in tort. Runcorn v. 
Shearer Lumber Prods., 107 Idaho 389,690 P.2d 324 (1984). The 1996 Amendment to the Statute 
changed all of that and made it clear that those prime contractors were deemed immune from suit, 
hence, the term categmy 1 statutory employer. Venters v. Sorrento Delaware, Inc., 141 Idaho 245, 
180 P.3d 392 (2005). 
The definition of a category 2 statutory employer is a bit more elusive. The statute 
immunizes owners or lessees of premises who are virtually the proprietor, operator of the business 
there carried on, etc. Thus the question becomes, who is the owner, lessee, or virtual proprietor of 
the business endeavor. 
Robison v. Bateman-Hall, Inc., 139 Idaho 207, 76 P.3d. 951 (2003) made it clear that a retail 
establishment not in the ordinary business of construction or roofing activities was not a virtual 
proprietor. As the Court articulated the test: 
To determine who is a virtual proprietor or operator, the Court must consider whether 
the work being done pertains to the business, trade, or occupation of the owner or 
proprietor and whether such business, trade, or occupation is being caiTied on by it 
for pecuniary gain. Id. "Generally, to find a business or person to be a statutoiy 
employer, the work being carried out by the independent contractor on the owner or 
proprietor's premises must have been the type that could have been carried out by 
employees of the owner or proprietor in the course ofits usual trade or business." Id. 
In sho1i, "if a person is normally equipped with manpower and tools to do a job and 
nevertheless contracts it to another employer, he is the statutory employer of the 
second employer's employees." 
139 Idaho 207 at 212. 
Thus one could say that a category 2 statutory employer is a "virtual" employer. This 
relationship is created by operation of the statute. Respondent has cited the same cases that 
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Appellant has cited on this topic and made an argument much like the one that was made to the Trial 
Comi. 
Missing from their briefing before the Trial Court and in the Trial Court's analysis was the 
recent case of Cordova v. Bonneville County Joint School District No. 93, Supreme Court docket 
no. 3 I 188 (7 /3 J/07). In Cordova the appellant was an employee of School District #91. She was 
assigned to a behavioral support division, which involved her traveling to various schools. During 
a school outing at a ski lodge, Ms. Cordova was injured while conducting a "rope/confidence" course 
designed to build cohesiveness and tiust among the various students of School District #93. 
Following her injury, Ms. Cordova sued School District 93. She had received worker's 
compensation from District 91, her direct employer. District 93 took the position that she was a 
statutory employee under Idaho Code §72-223 and, accordingly, could not sue the school district (93) 
for whom she was not a direct employee. The Court reasoned, she was clearly not a category 1 
employee under a plain reading of the statute. With respect to whether or not she could be 
considered a category 2 statutory employee, the Court said: 
We conclude that District 93 is not conducting a business; it is not engaged in 
activity for the purpose of"livelihood;" and operating a school is not a commercial 
activity. Furthermore, there is no evidence that District 93 is receiving any pecuniary 
gain in connection with operating the school. Thus, because District 93 is not a 
"business" in the ordinary meaning of the word, it cannot be Cordoba's category 2 
statutory employer. Id. 
Again, the Trial Court reasoned without citing this particular case as it was not pivotal. 
Notably, it is not cited by Respondent in it's brief before this Court. 
Simply stated, the Cordova case puts an end to any notion that John Ewing could in any way 
be considered the statutory employee of the Idaho Department of Transportation. Like the School 
District, the Highway District is not in the bnsiness of making money or even attempting to do so. 
Absent Cordova, the analysis of Respondent still misses the mark. The notion, that the 
owner of the prope1iy who hires a prime contractor can be a category 2 statutory employer, does not 
hold water. The State ofidaho is no more the category 2 statutory employer of John Ewing than a 
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homeowner who hires a contractor to remodel his house, who, in turn, hires a painting subcontractor 
where the painting subcontractor's employee becomes injured. The homeowner, like the retailer in 
the Robison case does not typically engage in remodeling contracts. Thus, he cannot be deemed a 
category 2 statutory employer. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, it is respectfully submitted for the reasons herein stated and in the prior 
briefing of Appellant, this case should be remanded for a jury trial on the merits so that Mr. Ewing 
can have his opportunity to prove that on the day that he fell due to faulty workmanship on a project 
unrelated to his work site he was not "recreating." There is no statutmy employer relationship 
present in this case. He cannot be deemed as category 1 statutory employer by virtue of the plain 
ordinary meaning of the statute. Under the holding in Cordova, the State ofidaho cannot be deemed 
a category 2 statutory employer by virtue of the nonpecuniary nature ofIDT's endeavors. 
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